Introduction
We study assignment problems involving packages, where a package consists of one or more units of homogeneous or heterogeneous objects (Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Gul and Stachetti (1995) , Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) ). Such problems are an extension of the standard assignment model in which the permissible packages are restricted to at most one object (Koopmans and Beckman (1957) , Gale (1960) , Shapley and Shubik (1972) ). We demonstrate the extent to which the results of the standard problem can(not) be generalized to the package version. We also show that a special case of the package assignment model in which there is a single seller -used to model the auctioning of packages -enjoys desirable properties not always shared by the model with several buyers and sellers.
The package assignment problem may also be regarded as a general equilibrium model with the simplification that individual preferences are quasilinear and the complication that except for the money commodity, all packages are indivisible and personalized in the sense that while each buyer can exchange with many sellers and each seller with many buyers, any buyer/seller pair can exchange only one package. Makowski (1979) has shown that for a general equilibrium model with personalized trading Walrasian equilibrium can be usefully extended to include non-linear prices. A key element of our analysis is an enlargement of the commodity space so that linear prices with respect to packages can represent non-linear prices with respect to objects. The standard assignment model rules out complementarity and subsitutability over objects. Even if a buyer's utility were non-additive over objects, the constraint that she can choose at most one precludes potential non-additivities from playing any role. In the package version, the non-additivity of buyers' utilities over objects is an essential ingredient. The standard assignment problem also assumes that each seller owns one object. In the package model, if a seller were to own only one object that would eliminate his packaging opportunities. When this constraint is relaxed, sellers face the following problem: Should they offer the objects they own for sale separately or in packages, and how should the packages be assembled?
We shall assume that sellers have zero reservation values for what they own. Consequently, in a model consisting of a given collection of buyers and a given collection of objects, the maximum gains from trade will be independent of the number of sellers and the distribution of their ownership of objects. The distribution of those gains will, of course, depend on the distribution of ownership. Nevertheless, when attention is confined to prices that are linear (additive) over objects, the division of the total gains between all the buyers and all the sellers does not depend on the distribution of ownership since a list of prices p k per unit of each object k will be a Walrasian equilibrium for one distribution of ownership only if it is an equilibrium for any other. With non-linear prices, however, the division of the gains between buyers and sellers does depend on the distribution of ownership. The more concentrated is the ownership of objects, the larger the set of possible divisions of the total gains from trade that can be priced and conversely, the more dispersed is the ownership the smaller the set of divisions of the gains that are consistent with price equilibrium. The standard assignment model is an integer programming problem that is well-known to be amenable to analysis by linear programming. Moreover, (i) the dual of the linear programming problem can be used to determine the payoffs to buyers and sellers and the prices of objects, (ii) the dual solutions form a lattice and (iii) the core can be "priced," i.e., the payoffs to buyers and sellers in Walrasian equilibria coincide with the core. We follow this mode of analysis in our extension to packages. In particular, we demonstrate that just as in the standard assignment model, Walrasian equilibrium in the package model exists if and only if the associated primal linear programming problem has an integer-valued solution, in which case the dual solutions form the set of Walrasian prices.
But without further restrictions, in the package assignment A dual solution compatible with an integer-valued solution to the primal (Walrasian equilibrium) need not exist; indeed, the core may be empty.
When Walrasian equilibria do exist:
The prices of packages may exhibit second degree price discrimination, i.e., the prices of packages are the same for all (anonymous) but they may be non-linear (non-additive) with respect to the prices of the objects they contain. We also examine versions of the model with Walrasian equilibria exhibiting both second and third degree price discrimination where the prices of packages are both non-linear and non-anonymous.
There are package assignment models for which non-linear price equilibria, and only non-linear price equilibria, exist.
The set of non-anonymous, non-linear price equilibria is contained in the core, but the core is not necessarily priced. Further, these prices need not form a lattice.
The standard assignment model exhibits the desirable property that an efficient solution can be achieved via a sealed-bid auction that is non-manipulable by the buyers (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) ). The existence of this auction depends on the fact that (a) the core can be priced and that (b) all buyers can simultaneously achieve their marginal products, where an individual's marginal product is an upper bound on his possible payoffs in the core. As neither of these properties can be guaranteed for the package assignment model, it would appear that there is little hope for a similar dominant strategy auction in this setting. Nevertheless, if there is only one seller in the package assignment model then Price (Walrasian) equilibria -possibly requiring non-linear non-anonymous pricing -always exist.
The core can be priced.
Even though the core is priced in the single seller package model, buyers need not achieve their marginal products in any core payoffs (therefore at any price equilibria); hence all such price equilibria may be manipulable. With an assumption that we call decreasing marginal product for buyers, there will exist price equilibria compatible with buyers receiving their marginal products. Therefore, with this qualification,
The core has a lattice property.
There exist non-manipulable sealed-bid auctions whose outcomes are price equilibria for the single seller package assignment model. The RTC and FCC auctions are examples of multi-object auctions in which buyers valuations may be non-additive in objects, i.e., a single seller package assignment model. Our results suggest the possible advantages of allowing for buyer bids on packages rather than on objects priced individually.
We describe the package assignment model in Section 2 and define four versions of Walrasian equilibrium with respect to it in Section 3. In Section 4 we establish an equivalence between the existence of equilibrium for each of the four versions of Walrasian equilibrium and the existence of optimal solutions to four corresponding linear programming problems. Section 5 introduces an ordering on the pattern of ownership among sellers and we show that the existence of Walrasian equilibria and the core in an economy with less concentrated ownership implies the same property in the more concentrated version of that model. In Section 6 we establish several properties of the model with the most concentrated pattern of ownership, namely the single seller model. In Section 7 we provide sufficient conditions for the single seller model to exhibit truth-telling price equilibrium. Examples are given throughout to illustrate our results or to show why they cannot be extended. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 8. Proofs are given in an Appendix. where y is the amounts of the K objects sold. The seller has no endowment of the money commodity and therefore the utility of no trade for the seller is W s 0; 0 = 0.
The model
Rather The utility of an assignment for a buyer is based on the total package the buyer obtains after collecting the packages purchased from each of the sellers. For example, if the buyer purchases half of the books in a matched collection from one seller and the other half from another seller, the utility is the same as if the entire collection were purchased from a single seller. That is, the pricing function is linear. We call this a first order pricing function. Makowski (1979) The primitive prices are p bs w, for all w 2 Z K + , for all s; b. This version of pricing is non-linear and completely non-anonymous in that prices depend on the identities of the buyer and the seller between whom a transaction occurs.
Thus, only a first order pricing function is linear and only first and second order pricing functions are anonymous. It is clear from (1)- (4) that a j= 1; 2; 3 order pricing function is a special case of j + 1 order pricing function.
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To rationalize non-linear pricing, non-anonymous pricing we assume that:
B1. Although each buyer can deal with many sellers and each seller with many buyers, a buyer/seller pair can exchange at most one package.
B2. Two buyers may not form a purchasing cartel.
B3. Buyers may not resell packages to each other.
B1 implies that prices can be superadditive. That is, pw + pw 0 p w + w 0 , for some w + w 0 2 C s is possible.
3 B2 implies that prices can be subadditive. That is, pw + pw 0 p w + w 0 for some w + w 0 2 C s is possible.
4 B3 implies that it is possible to sustain p bs z 6 = p b 0 s 0 z for b; s 6 = b 0 ; s 0 .
The definitions imply that if Z; Y is a j order assignment and P b ; P s is a j order pricing function then, as p bs 0,
A Walrasian equilibrium is an assignment and prices such that consumers maximize utility, producers maximize profits and markets clear. The package assignment model is an exchange economy (there is no production), but the buyers and sellers resemble households and firms, respectively. As households, buyers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint P b Z b + m b = 0. With quasi-linear preferences, maximization of utility subject to the budget constraint is equivalent to the objective
As firms, sellers choose packages from among their feasible sets to maximize profits. Given our conventions with respect to U s , profit maximization is equivalent to max U s Y s + P s Y s :
A Walrasian equilibrium of order j= 1; 2; 3; 4) for the package assignment problem The last condition that total money payments equals total receipts implies that the prices of packages in excess supply must be zero.
Lemma 1 and the fact that a j= 1; 2; 3 order pricing function is a j + 1 order pricing function implies that a j= 1; 2; 3 order Walrasian price is a j + 1 order Walrasian price. Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Gul and Stacchetti (1995) , Ma (1996) , and Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) considered first order Walrasian equilibrium for the package assignment model.
The different orders of Walrasian equilibria will imply different distributions of the total gains from trade, but they do not differ with respect to overall efficiency of their assignment of non-money commodities.
Theorem 1: If Z ; Y ; P b ; P s is Walrasian equilibrium of order j= 1; 2; 3; 4 for E,
Since a Walrasian equilibrium of order j is a special case of order j+1, Theorem 1 along with the quasilinearity hypothesis imply that the Walrasian equilibria of order four permits the widest range of possible money payments with respect to a given assignment of nonmoney commodities. Consequently, the distribution of the gains from trade which can be "priced" is enlarged. This will lead, below, to the implication that a larger, and sometimes complete, set of allocations in the core can be priced. Also, when the narrower set of possible distributions of the gains required by lower order pricing equilibria -with their more stringent restrictions -cannot be priced, a distribution of the gains compatible with higher order pricing might exist. This is also true in Makowski (1979) 's model personalized trading.
LP characterizations of Walrasian equilibria
In this section we show that each of the above varieties of Walrasian equilibria Z ; Y ; P b ; P s is equivalent to an integer-valued solution to a corresponding linear programming problem, where Z ; Y is a solution to the primal and P b ; P s is a solution to the dual. In this respect, therefore, the package assignment model is similar to the standard assignment model. 5 Unlike the standard assignment model, however, an integer-valued solution to the corresponding linear programming problem does not always exist. 5 An LP characterization of Walrasian equilibria with quasi-linear preferences also holds when commodities are divisible (Makowski and Ostroy (1996) is the total demand for objects contained in the packages demanded in Z.
The inequalities for A 2 require that the total number of packages of type w supplied by sellers are at least as large as the total number requested by buyers; hence, it is equivalent to a second order assignment.
The inequalities for A 3 , which are equivalent to third order assignments, require that the total number of packages of type w supplied by sellers to a buyer b are at least as large as the total number requested by b from sellers.
The definitions of F bs w and G bs w imply that when x b ; x s 2 f 0; 1g, the in-
As the remaining constraints for the LP j E differ, so do the duals constraints. 
b ; s ; p bs w 0; 8b; s; w:
Although the prices of packages in the constraints do not appear in the objective function (because the associated right-hand side constraints have zero values), it is helpful to emphasize that the minimum in the dual is taken over the prices of packages as well. Indeed, minimization with respect to the prices of packages determines the minimum values of b and s in the objective function of the dual.
be the indirect utility (or conjugate) functions, where the form of the indirect utility function depends upon which of the four forms of pricing functions is employed. Inspection of the dual constraints reveals that the 's are feasible if and only if b f U b P b and s f U s P s . Since the objective of the dual is to minimize the values, at their optimal values they will be equated to the values of the indirect utility functions for some prices P b ; P s . Therefore, although the prices of packages only appear in the dual constraints, they determine the "prices" of buyers and sellers in the objective function. To summarize, the problem for DLP j E is to find pricing functions of order j which minimize the total gains to the buyers and sellers, while the problem for LP j E is to find assignments of order j which maximize those gains. The LP characterization of Walrasian equilibria imply the following. Theorem 2 says that a Walrasian equilibrium of order j exists if and only if it is a solution to the associated LP j . Consequently, the critical condition for existence of Walrasian equilibrium of order j is the equality vE = vIP j E = vLP j E :
Because of the evident inequality
existence is in general problematic. The following explains why appeal to more general (i.e., higher order) pricing functions can enlarge the domain of existence.
Note that as j increases the constraints in LP j E become increasingly restrictive (a j order assignment is a j , 1 order assignment) and the constraints in DLP j E become decreasingly restrictive (first order pricing is a special case of second order pricing, etc.). Therefore, vLP j+1 E = vDLP j+1 E vLP j E = vDLP j E ; j = 1; 2; 3;
where the equalities are guaranteed by the basic Theorem of Linear Programming.
If vLP 1 E vE = vIP j E , first order Walrasian equilibria cannot exist. Nevertheless, if the restrictions imposed by j 1 order equilibria are sufficiently binding that vLP j E = vE for j = 2; 3, or 4, then j order equilibria will exist.
The following example from Kelso and Crawford (1982) (who use it to show nonexistence of first order Walrasian prices) shows that Walrasian equilibrium of order 2 may not exist; but in this example Walrasian equilibria of order 3 do exist.
Example 1: There is one seller endowed with one unit each of three commodities. The reservation values of the two buyers, 1 and 2, are in Table 1 . 3.75 6.9 6.5 6.5 9 p 2 z 3.5 3.75 3.4 6.5 6.5 6.9 9 Table 2 shows order 3 Walrasian prices, p b , b = 1; 2. The only assignments that these prices support are the two efficient assignments.
Another example shows that Walrasian equilibrium of order 4 need not exist.
Example 2: There are three buyers, ; , and , and three sellers, 1, 2, and 3. There are three distinct commodities and seller s, s = 1; 2; 3, is endowed with one unit of commodity s. The three buyers' reservation value functions are shown in Table 3 . Each seller s has four feasible sales, depending on whether s sells his unit to buyer or to buyer or to buyer or to no one (buyer ). Let Y s b be the feasible sale in which seller s, s = 1; 2; 3, assigns his commodity to buyer b, = ; ; ; . As there is a one-to-one correspondence between Z b = z bs and P s z bs in this example, we will denote Z b by P s z bs . Consider the following optimal feasible solution to LP 4 E :
(iv) x 1; 1; 0 = 0:5, x Z = 0 for all Z 6 = 1; 1; 0. That is, the assignment in which buyer buys a unit of commodity 1 from seller 1, a unit of commodity 2 from seller 2, and nothing from seller 3 is assigned weight 0.5 and every other assignment is assigned a weight of zero. Remark 2: (The role of numbers) Let E r be an r-replica of E. Then rvLP 1 E = vLP 1 E r vIP j E r rvIP j E ;
i.e., while the LP 1 extension of the model is scale invariant, the underlying model is not.
If a first order Walrasian equilibrium exists for E, hence vLP 1 E = vIP j E , then that allocation can be replicated with prices remaining the same to provide a first order Walrasian equilibrium in E r . The absence of scale invariance in E is another way to see why first order Walrasian equilibria will not generally exist in the package assignment model. Contrast this with the LP j extension of the model, j = 2; 3; 4 which does not exhibit scale invariance, i.e.,
vLP j E r rvLP j E : Thus, j order price equilibria, j 2, more nearly reflect the properties of E.
Let E 1 denote a continuum economy with mass one of each type of buyer and seller in E. It is readily demonstrated that vLP 1 E = vLP j E 1 = vIP j E 1 :
In other words, in the continuum there is no distinction between the IP j and LP j versions of the model and both achieve the same maximum gains as the LP 1 extension of the original model E. Consequently, all price equilibria in E 1 are utility equivalent to first order Walrasian equilibria. Moreover, such equilibria always exist in E 1 . The existence conclusion in E can be refined: There exists an integer r such that for each n = 1; 2; 3; : : : , nrvLP 1 E = nvIP j E r :
To see this, observe that all the constraints in LP j E have integer coefficients and therefore all extreme points of the feasible set have rational co-ordinates. Hence, there exists an optimal solution in rational numbers. Let r be an integer which when multiplied with this rational optimal solution results in an integer. For all integer multiples of the replica economy E r , a first order Walrasian equilibrium exists.
Pricing, the pattern of ownership, and the core
The first order definition of Walrasian equilibrium is insensitive to the pattern of ownership by sellers. To illustrate, suppose E and E 0 are two package assignment problems differing in the number and distribution of ownership of the endowments of sellers, but having the same buyers and the same total !. Suppose Z; Y; P b ; P s is a first order equilibrium for E, with first order pricing functions P b and P s defined by the vector of prices p = p k for the objects. If Y s is profit-maximizing at prices P s defined by p, then P s Y s = p ! s , for any ! s . Hence, no matter what the distribution of initial endowments in E 0 , the total supply in terms of total objects supplied is !. Since the buyers remain unchanged in E 0 , their demands at p would also remain the same. Because first order feasibility (market clearance) is based on market totals of objects, p remains an equilibrium price vector for E 0 .
Conversely, the pattern of ownership can restrict the variety of pricing equilibria. Note that B1 implies that prices are additive across sellers. That is, if a buyer buys package z from seller s and package z 0 from seller s 0 , then the cost is necessarily additive. Suppose each seller is endowed with a single unit of a single object. Then, if pricing is anonymous, it is necessarily first order. This is the approach taken in Kelso and Crawford (1982) . To derive anonymity, it suffices to allow buyers to resell to each other.
In general, however, the pattern of ownership in the package assignment model is important is determining the existence and order of equilibrium. We describe some of these implications below.
A (finite) number of exchange economies may be formed around a set of buyers and an aggregate initial endowment. Define a strict partial order on this set of exchange economies as follows. Let Eu b ; 8b = 1; 2; :::; B; ! s ; 8s = 1; 2; :::; S and E 0 u b ; 8b = 1; 2; :::; B; ! 0 s 0 ; 8s 0 = 1; 2; :::; S 0 be two exchange economies such that P S s=1 ! s = P S 0 s 0 =1 ! 0 s 0 = !. Suppose that S S 0 . Let T 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T S , T s 6 = ; 8s = 1; 2; :::; S, be a partition of the set of sellers f1; 2; :::; S 0 g in E 0 . Ownership in E is more concentrated than in economy E 0 , denoted E c E 0 , if and only if S S 0 and ! s = P s 0 2T s ! 0 s 0 ; 8s = 1; 2; :::; S. If some of the sellers in an economy E 0 form cartels which results in a new economy E then E c E 0 . Given a set of buyers and an aggregate endowment, the economy in which there is one seller per unit of a commodity is the least concentrated economy and the economy with only one seller is the most concentrated economy. Theorem 3: Suppose that ownership is more concentrated in E than in E 0 . Then, if a Walrasian equilibrium of order j = 1; 2; 3 exists in E 0 then a Walrasian equilibrium of the same order exists in E.
The following example shows that the converse to Theorem 3 is false.
Example 3: There are two buyers, 1 and 2, and the aggregate endowment is three units of one commodity. Thus C = f1; 2; 3g. The two buyers have identical reservation value functions given by u1 = 0, u2 = 3, and u3 = 4. There are no linear Walrasian prices in this example (see Table 1 , Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) ). It may also be verified that there is no Walrasian equilibrium of order 2 and 3 in the least concentrated economy.
However, prices p1 = 0, p2 = 3, and p3 = 4 are order 2 Walrasian prices in the most concentrated version of this economy. 6 2
The core
To describe the core, additional notation is required. The set of players is N f 1; 2; :::; Bg f1; 2; :::; Sg. For any subset T N, let T S T f 1; 2; :::; Sg be the set of sellers in T and let T B T f 1; 2; :::; Bg be the set of buyers in T.
Recall that vE is the maximum gains available in the economy E. Regard E N and let V N = vE. Similarly, let V T be the maximum gains in the economy consisting of those buyers and sellers in T. Let ZT ; Y T be any j order assignment such that z bs = 0 for all b 2 T B and s 6 2 T S , and y bs = 0 for all b 6 2 T B and s 2 T S . That is, at Z T ; Y T buyers and sellers in T trade only among themselves. Lemma 2 assures us that regardless of j,
Note that: Theorem 4 establishes that as ownership becomes more concentrated it becomes more likely that the core is nonempty. This is analagous to Theorem 3, in which a similar result was established for Walrasian equilibrium.
Theorem 4: Let E and E 0 be such that E c E 0 . If coreE 0 6 = , then coreE 6 = .
The next theorem shows that the set of j(=1 -4) Walrasian payoffs is in the core. This, together with Theorem 1, which established the efficiency of all four types of Walrasian equilibrium, imply that these standard properties of Walrasian equilibrium do not depend on linear, anonymous prices.
Theorem 5: Let b = f U b P b and s = f U s P s , where P b ; P s are Walrasian equilibrium prices of order j= 1; 2; 3; 4 for the economy E. Then Π B ; Π S 2 coreE.
In the standard assignment model every allocation in the core can be priced, i.e., every vector of utility payoffs in the core coincides with the indirect utilities associated with some Walrasian equilibrium prices. But an example shows that in the package model the converse of Theorem 5 is not true. The objective function value of vLP 4 E at this optimal solution is 11.75. As vIPE = 11:5, Theorem 2 implies that order 4 Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. Hence order 1 or 2 or 3 Walrasian equilibria do not exist either.
The characteristic function of this exchange economy is V f;1g = V f;2g = V f;1; 2g = 4 V f; 1g = V f; 2g = 7 V f; 1; 2g = 8:5 V f;;1g = V f;;2g = 9 V f;;1; 2g = 11:5; with V T = 0 for all other coalitions. The point 1 ; 2 ; ; = 2:5; 2:5; 2; 4:5 is in the core. However, there is no order j= 1; 2; 3; 4 Walrasian equilibrium which yields this (or any other) core point. Denote the package assignment model with a single seller, the most concentrated pattern of ownership, by E 1 . We show that Walrasian prices of order 3 exist. 8 Under an assumption 7 The core consists of the convex hull of points (2.5, 2.5, 2, 4.5), (1, 1, 3, 6.5), (1.5, 1.5, 3, 5.5), and (2.5, 2.5, 1.5, 5). 8 In this model, there is no difference between the Walrasian equilibria of order 3 and 4.
that we call decreasing marginal product for buyers, the core has a lattice property and it can be priced.
In E Theorem 6: In E 1 ,
Therefore, a Walrasian equilibrium of order 3 exists in E 1 .
An immediate consequence of Theorems 5 and 6 is that coreE 1 is non-empty. Example 1 of Section 4 implies that Theorem 6 is not true for Walrasian equilibria of order less than 3.
The next result establishes core equivalence for the single seller model. The core consists of points b ; b = 1; 2; 3; s 0 such that b 6, b + b 0 11, 1 + 2 + 3 + s = 21. Thus, the points 6; 5; 5; 5 and 5; 6; 5; 5 lie in the core but the point 6; 6; 5; 4 does not.
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The following condition ensures that the core has the lattice property: Buyers have decreasing marginal product in E 1 if for all T 1 ; T 2 ; T 3 f 1; 2; :::; Bg such that T i T j = for all i 6 = j, we have
That is, the marginal product of additional buyers (the set T 3 ) joining a coalition which includes the seller s, decreases as the coalition (that is, the set T 3 joins) becomes larger.
Theorem 8: Suppose that buyers have decreasing marginal product. Then coreE 1 has the lattice property.
Theorem 8 has the following corollary. 
A Dominant Strategy Auction
E 1 is the setting for a multi-object auction. Buyers may submit bids on any z 2 C. In a Vickrey auction, truth-telling is a dominant strategy, so in this discussion we assume that buyers submit their reservation value function as bids for all the objects being auctioned. A well-known condition from Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism theory is that if an efficient mechanism (auction) is to guarantee truth-telling for buyer b, then in addition to the utility u b z b that the buyer receives from his part of the efficient assignment Z ; Y , the money payment m b must be such that the buyer's total utility is equal to his marginal
plus possibly a lump sum. Moreover, when total utility received by the buyer must also satisfy an "individual rationality" or "participation constraint" condition, the lump sum must be zero (Makowski and Ostroy (1987) ). This condition (that each buyer receive his marginal product) is also necessary for any efficient, dominant strategy auction (Holmstrom (1979) ). It is an obvious consequence of the definition of the core that an individual's marginal product is an upper bound of the set of possible payoffs an individual can receive. Suppose that BMP2 coreE 1 . Consider the following auction mechanism: Buyers submit bids on every subset. The seller computes third order Walrasian prices which yield the BMP for the stated bids. Buyers report their demand at these prices to the seller, who then assigns each buyer a subset that she demands. The above discussion implies that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for buyers and this auction results in an efficient assignment.
Example 5 of Section 6 shows, however, that BMP may lie outside the core. In this example, the BMP is (6,6,6,3): 3 to the seller and 6 to each of the buyers. This point is not in the core as 6 + 3 V fs; 1g = 10. The condition of decreasing marginal product for buyers is sufficient to ensure that BMP lies in the core. The example below shows that under the hypothesis of Theorem 9, Walrasian pricing of order less than 3 may not price the BMP and therefore may not result in a dominant strategy auction.
Example 6: One seller, s, owns four identical units of an object. There are two buyers, a and b, for the objects with reservation values is in Table 4.   TABLE 4 z 1 2 3 4 u a z 4 7 9 9 u b z 4 7 9 10 The characteristic function of this economy is V fs; ag = 9, V fs; bg = 10, V fs; a; bg = 14, and V T = 0 for all other T f s; a; bg. The BMP is MP a = 4; MP b = 5; R s = 5.
As buyers have decreasing marginal product, Theorem 9 implies that the BMP is in the core and that a third order Walrasian pricing function yields this point. At this Walrasian equilibrium, each buyer obtains two units but buyer a pays 3, and buyer b pays 2. Therefore, although Walrasian equilibrium of order 2 exists in this example, there is no Walrasian equilibria of order less than 3 which yields the BMP.
8 Concluding Remarks
It is well-known that many commonly used auctions for selling multiple indivisible objects are inefficient (see Ausubel and Cramton (1995) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1995), and Bikhchandani (1996) ). The multi-object version of the Vickrey auction is efficient when buyers' values are privately known. Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for buyers to truthfully report their values. However, as the Vickrey auction requires bids on every conceivable bundle of objects, it is impractical to use for selling more than a handful of objects.
An efficient and dominant strategy auction exists in a setting where several, possibly heterogenous, objects are sold to buyers who have zero utility for a second object, i.e., under the unit demand assumption (see Leonard (1983) , Demange and Gale (1985) , and Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) ). In this auction, the objects are sold at the lowest Walrasian prices. The existence of this dominant strategy and efficient auction depends on two properties:
A. Walrasian equilibrium exists.
B. All buyers can simultaneously achieve their marginal product at a Walrasian equilibrium.
In our model, property A is satisfied in the single seller case. If buyers have decreasing marginal product then property B is satisfied, and there exists an efficient multi-object sealed-bid auction in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy for buyers. The sealed-bid auction proceeds as follows: (i) bidders submit bids on every package of objects, (ii) the seller uses these bids to compute the lowest Walrasian prices for the packages, and (iii) each buyer chooses a package which maximizes his utility at these prices.
This auction is not any simpler than the multi-object Vickrey auction. However, in our framework it is possible to investigate when simpler Walrasian prices and therefore a simpler sealed-bid auction exists. In particular, when properties A and B are satisfied with either (I) Walrasian prices of order 2 in the single seller economy or (II) with Walrasian prices of order 3 in a less concentrated economy then the sealed-bid auction can be simplified. We plan to investigate conditions on buyer preferences under which either I or II obtains. 
We have shown (17) and (18) to be true for b = 1. Equation (17) 
where the inequality follows from (10). Theorem 2 implies the existence of a third-order Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Suppose that Π B ; s 2 coreE 1 . Let Z ; Z be an efficient third order assignment, i.e., where the first inequality follows from the definition of V and the second inequality from Π B ; s 2 coreE 1 . Thus, the seller also maximizes utility at prices P b ; P s .
Consequently, Z ; Z ; p b is a third order Walrasian equilibrium which yields the payoffs Π B ; s .
Theorems 8 and 9 require the following lemma.
Lemma A: Let T 1 ; T 2 f 1; 2; :::; Bg such that T 1 T 2 = . If buyers have decreasing marginal product then X b2T 2 h V fsg T 1 T 2 ,V fsg T 1 T 2 nfbg i V fsg T 1 T 2 ,V fsg T 1 : (31)
Proof: Let K be the number of elements in T 1 . We need to prove the Lemma for all T 2 with B ,K or fewer elements since larger sets T 2 will not satisfy T 1 T 2 = . The proof is by induction on the size of T 2 .
Suppose that T 2 = fb 1 g where b 1 6 2 T 1 . As where the first inequality follows from (12) and the second from the induction hypothesis. This completes the proof. where the inequality follows from Lemma A (with T = fsg T 1 and NnT = T 2 ). If s 6 2 T then V T = 0 and the core inequality is satisfied.
Proof of Theorem
Thus, BMP2 coreE 1 . By Theorem 7, there exists a third order Walrasian equilibrium which gives agents their payoffs in BMP.
